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CASE LAW
A. Court of Justice
The dividing line between delegated and implementing acts, part two:The
Court of Justice settles the issue in Commission v. Parliament and Council
(Visa reciprocity)
Case C-88/14,Commission v. Parliament and Council, Judgment of the Court
(Grand Chamber) of 16 July 2015, EU:C:2015:499
1. Introduction
The present case is one of the many inter-institutional conflicts which recently
came before the Court of Justice, dealing with controversies resulting from the
Lisbon Treaty. That Treaty introduced the terms “delegated act” and
“implementing act”, two non-legislative acts, in Articles 290 and 291 TFEU
without making a clear distinction between them. It was therefore only a
matter of time before the Court would be called upon to draw the dividing
line.1 Biocides provided the first occasion to do so,2 but that opportunity was
not fully seized by the Court. In Visa reciprocity however, the second case on
the demarcation line between delegated and implementing acts, the Court
seems to have settled the issue.
2. A reminder of the normative framework
In an annotation to the Biocides case in this Review, Ritleng noted that in the
pre-Lisbon world no distinction between delegated and implementing acts
existed and instead there was only the distinction following the Köster case
“between legislative acts in the substantive meaning of the term, that is acts of
1. Ritleng, “La délégation du pouvoir législatif de l’union européenne”, in Cohen-Jonathan,
Constantinesco, Michel, Piris and Wachsman (Eds.), Chemins d’Europe: Mélanges en
l’honneur de Jean Paul Jacqué (Dalloz, 2010), p. 576.
2. Case C-427/12, Commission v. Parliament and Council, EU:C:2014:170.
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general scope directly based on the Treaty itself, and implementing acts which
were based on legislative acts and intended to ensure their implementation.”3
Within these implementing acts a distinction could then be made between
those acts “‘quasi-legislative’ in nature, [while] some others were regarded as
more purely ‘executive’.”4
Thus, Köster5 made the distinction between (i) formal legislative acts and
(ii) implementing acts. The former were adopted by the legislature proper and
laid down (at least) the essential elements of the matter to be regulated, the
latter were adopted by the Commission pursuant to Article 155 EEC (later
complemented by Art. 145 EEC, under the Amsterdam numbering Arts. 211
and 202 EC). Implementation was then understood in a broad sense and
encompassed both normative acts (substantive legislative acts) and executive
measures. As long as they did not alter the essential elements of the formal
legislative act, and the Court took a broad view of what non-essential meant,6
the Commission had the competence to adopt them.
Of course, this meant that the pre-Lisbon notion of “implementation” was a
bit too broad. When the Commission altered a legislative act it could not
properly be said to be implementing that act. The function of altering a
legislative act is fundamentally different from implementing that act and in the
EU legal order both activities also have different repercussions for the vertical
and horizontal distribution of powers.As a rule, the implementation of EU law
is left to the Member States’administrations, pursuant toArticle 291(1)TFEU,
while legislative acts are, evidently, adopted by the EU legislature. As a result,
when the Commission exercises an implementing (in the strict sense) power,
the EU’s vertical distribution of powers is affected. When the Commission
alters formal legislative acts, the horizontal distribution of powers is affected.
The Lisbon Treaty reflected this by making a distinction, in the broad notion
of implementation, between executive acts that amend or supplement formal
legislative acts, i.e. the delegated acts under Article 290 TFEU, and executive
acts that (merely) implement generally binding EU acts, i.e. the implementing
acts under Article 291 TFEU.
The distinction also led to the rationalization of the supervision regime
which had hitherto been in force: post-Lisbon, comitology only applies when
implementation in the strict sense is at issue but not when delegated acts are
3. Ritleng, “The dividing line between delegated and implementing acts: The Court of
Justice sidesteps the difficulty in Commission v. Parliament and Council (Biocides)”, 52 CML
Rev. (2015), 243–257.
4. Ibid.
5. Case 25/70, Köster, EU:C:1970:115.
6. See Case 23/75,Rey Soda v.Cassa Conguaglio Zucchero, EU:C:1975:142, para 14; Case
C-240/90, Germany v. Commission, EU:C:1992:408, para 37.
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adopted. The Treaty thus clarified that if the Commission exercises an
implementation competence, control should be exercised by the actors
normally responsible for implementation, i.e. the Member States (through
comitology). Similarly, when the Commission amends or supplements a
formal legislative act, control should be exercised by the formal legislature
(under the ordinary legislative procedure, the Council and Parliament).
3. Legal and factual background to the case
The present dispute concerned Regulation 1289/2013 of Parliament and
Council7 revising the reciprocity mechanism in Regulation 539/2001 on visa
requirements for third country nationals.8 The revision was necessary, inter
alia to bring the Regulation in line with the Lisbon Treaty.9 The original
Regulation lists the third countries whose nationals require a visa when
entering the Schengen area in its Annex I, while the third countries whose
nationals are exempted from a visa requirement are listed in Annex II. Should
an Annex II country impose a visa obligation on the nationals of one (or
several) Member States, the reciprocity mechanism kicks in. Under the
contested Regulation 1289/2013, the mechanism comprises three main
successive stages, and a preliminary stage.10 In the preliminary stage, the
Member State concerned notifies the EU institutions, and the information
provided is published by the Commission in the Official Journal.11 If bilateral
7. Regulation (EU) 1289/2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 Dec.
2013 amending Council Regulation (EC) 539/2001 listing the third countries whose nationals
must be in possession of visas when crossing the external borders and those whose nationals are
exempt from that requirement, O.J. 2013, L 347/74.
8. Council Regulation (EC) 539/2001 of 15 Mar. 2001 listing the third countries whose
nationals must be in possession of visas when crossing the external borders and those whose
nationals are exempt from that requirement, O.J. 2001, L 81/1.
9. Under Art. 67 EC the Council was the sole legislative body (the Parliament only being
consulted), while underArt. 77(2) TFEU the ordinary legislative procedure applies. In addition,
under the original Regulation, the suspension decision was made pursuant to a secondary legal
basis, a practice repudiated by the Court in theMinimum common lists case. See Case C-133/06,
Parliament v. Council, EU:C:2008:257. For a discussion of this case, see Craig, 46 CML Rev.
(2009), 1265–1275. For this reason, the Commission originally proposed a (much simpler)
reciprocity mechanism whereby decisions on suspensions would be adopted pursuant to the
ordinary legislative procedure. See COM(2011) 290 final.
10. The procedure could also be said to encompass four stages (including the preliminary
stage), but to enhance the readability of this note, reference is made to the three stages as
identified by A.G. Mengozzi and the Court. See Opinion of A.G. Mengozzi in Case C-88/14,
Commission v. Parliament & Council, EU:C:2015:304, para 9 et seq.
11. See Art. 1 (4)a of Regulation 539/2001 as amended by Regulation 1289/2013.
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contacts with the third country concerned do not result in the lifting of the visa
requirement, within a period of 90 days following the publication in the
Official Journal, the Member State concerned may ask the Commission to
suspend the EU exemption for the third country.12 The Commission is not
obliged to do so, since it should inter alia take into account possible
repercussions on the EU’s and the Member States’ relations with that third
country.13
In the first stage, at the latest six months following the publication in the
Official Journal, and further at six months intervals as long as the third
country has not lifted the visa requirement,14 the Commission may adopt an
implementing act. That act, adopted following the examination procedure,
suspends the exemption for the nationals of the third country concerned for a
period of six months.15 In the alternative the Commission adopts a report
indicating the reasons why it decides not to suspend the exemption.16
In the second stage, and if after 24 months following the publication in the
Official Journal, the third country has still not lifted the visa requirement, “the
Commission shall adopt a delegated act . . . temporarily suspending the
application of Annex II for a period of 12 months for the nationals of that third
country.”17 To this end Annex II is amended, unlike in the first stage, through
the addition of a footnote next to the third country concerned. In the third
stage, if the third country has still not lifted the visa requirement after six
months of the entry into force of that delegated act, the Commission may
submit a legislative proposal for the amendment of the basic regulation.
In the present case, the Commission requested the (partial) annulment of
Regulation 1289/2013 insofar as it violated Articles 290 and 291 TFEU, since
it provided recourse to a delegated act in the second stage of the procedure.
The Commission was of the opinion that such a suspension of the visa
exemption should be effected through an implementing act, just like in the
first stage.
In this complex area of law, the Commission’s single plea was deceptively
simple: the choice for a delegated act in the second stage of the procedure was
wrong, since delegated acts can only be used, following Article 290 TFEU to
amend or supplement a legislative act, while in casu the legislative act would
be implemented, requiring recourse to the implementing act foreseen in
Article 291 TFEU. Behind this plea the many controversies related to the new
12. See Art. 1 (4)c of Regulation 539/2001 as amended by Regulation 1289/2013.
13. See Art. 1 (4)d of Regulation 539/2001 as amended by Regulation 1289/2013.
14. See Art. 1 (4)e of Regulation 539/2001 as amended by Regulation 1289/2013.
15. See Art. 1 (4)e (i) of Regulation 539/2001 as amended by Regulation 1289/2013.
16. See Art. 1 (4)e (ii) of Regulation 539/2001 as amended by Regulation 1289/2013.
17. See Art. 1 (4)f of Regulation 539/2001 as amended by Regulation 1289/2013.
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system under Lisbon lay hidden. In the course of the proceedings in the
present case, the Court handed down its ruling in Biocides. It has rightly been
noted that while Biocides was a first clarification of the central issue, the
Court would have to elucidate the differences between the two acts in further
cases.18 As a result, a large part of the exchanges between the parties in the
present case dealt with the question of how the ruling in Biocides should be
interpreted. While Biocides will not be discussed as such in this annotation,19
the basic elements of that case will be taken up in the discussion of the
Advocate General’s Opinion.
4. Opinion of theAdvocate General
4.1. Revisiting the Biocides case
Advocate General Mengozzi commented elaborately on the Court’s ruling in
Biocides, if only because the parties proposed different readings of that ruling
in their submissions. In Biocides, the Court had confirmed that “the EU
legislature has discretion when it decides to confer a delegated power on the
Commission pursuant to Article 290(1) TFEU or an implementing power
pursuant to Article 291(2) TFEU.”20 While this could be understood as
confirming the Council’s suggestion that a grey area between the two types of
acts exists,21 Advocate General Mengozzi emphasized that the Court in
Biocides had not explicitly ruled on whether Articles 290 and 291 TFEU are
mutually exclusive.22
The Advocate General (like Ritleng in a previous issue of this Review),
noted the tension in Biocides between the legislature’s discretion in choosing
between the delegated or implementing act and the Court’s subsequent
extensive review, spanning 11 paragraphs, of that choice.23 According to the
Advocate General, Biocides confirmed that the legislature has discretion in
choosing between the two acts, but following that choice it has to work out the
18. Michel, “Du départ entre acte délégué et acte d’exécution”, 24Europe (2014), No. 5, 18.
19. For a discussion of the Biocides case, see Ritleng, op. cit. supra note 3; Chamon,
“Clarifying the divide between delegated and implementing acts?”, 42 LIEI (2015), 175–189;
Michel, op. cit. supra note 18; Buchanan, “The conferral of power to the Commission put to the
test”, 5 European Journal of Risk Regulation (2014), 267–272.
20. See Opinion of A.G. Mengozzi, para 40.
21. Buchanan also notes that inBiocides the Court declined to rule on whetherArts. 290 and
291 TFEU are mutually exclusive and instead firmly stated that the EU legislature has
discretion in its choice. See Buchanan, op. cit. supra note 19, at 271.
22. See Opinion of A.G. Mengozzi, para 35.
23. Ibid., para 37; Ritleng, op. cit. supra note 3, at 254.
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content and the structure of the basic act so as to conform to the exigencies of
either Article 290 or 291 TFEU. Although these articles do not refer to the
degree of discretion left to the Commission, Advocate General Mengozzi
further found that the Court in Biocides effectively took account thereof in its
assessment of the legislature’s choice. Like several commentators,24 the
Advocate General noted that the Court had actually not expressly referred to
“the discretion conferred on the Commission as a factor by reference to which
it is possible to distinguish between delegated acts and implementing acts”;25
but since the Court found that the system established by the legislature was
sufficiently detailed and defined, this amounted, according to the Advocate
General, to a finding that no significant discretionary power was entrusted to
the Commission.
“[T]he breadth of discretion, greater or lesser, that is conferred on the
Commission”26 was then used by the Advocate General as a criterion to draw
the dividing line between the delegated and implementing act. However,
regardless of the issue of discretion, the measures which the Commission
would adopt in casu would also formally amend the basic legislative act,
begging the question whether in such a case the issue of discretion is at all
relevant. I.e. if a formal amendment of a legislative act is at issue, should the
choice not automatically fall on the delegated act?
Parliament and Council had defended this position27 while the Commission
suggested that amendments that do not call for the exercise of any discretion
and which do not alter the normative content of a legislative act should be
effected through implementing acts. The answer to the question depends on
how Article 290 TFEU should be interpreted – textually, contextually,
genetically and teleologically. The Advocate General indeed noted that a
formalistic approach (advanced by Parliament and Council) would have the
benefit of clarity28 and that the wording of Article 290 TFEU does not seem to
permit any other interpretation, meaning that a legislative act is amended
whenever any of its elements are changed through deletion, addition or
replacement.29
While the Advocate General thus favoured the formalistic approach, he was
not unsympathetic to the Commission’s substantive approach either. For this,
24. See Chamon, op. cit. supra note 19, at 188; Ritleng, op. cit. supra note 3, at 252.
25. Opinion of A.G. Mengozzi, para 26.
26. Ibid., para 25.
27. According to the Council, the question of discretion is never relevant to draw the
dividing line; according to Parliament it is only relevant when it is not a formal amendment
which is at issue (which in casu it was), see Opinion of A.G. Mengozzi, para 23.
28. It may further be noted that one of the aims of the Lisbon Treaty was to simplify EU
decision-making.
29. Opinion of A.G. Mengozzi, paras. 41 and 47.
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the Advocate General went back to the issue of discretion, finding that where
the Commission exercises discretion it is only normal for the legislature to
review the Commission’s decisions through the mechanisms provided in
Article 290 TFEU. In such a case the legislature should be able to intervene if
the Commission unduly interferes with a legislative act. On the other hand, if
the Commission does not exercise (meaningful) discretion, there is no real
reason why the legislature ought to review the Commission’s decisions,
making recourse to the delegated act unjustified.30
The Advocate General further scrutinized this in the light of the principle of
institutional balance. Although he only touched upon this issue briefly, this
element of the Opinion is of great interest, since the Court of Justice hardly
ever enforces the principle of institutional balance in its case law.31 Here, the
Advocate General suggested that the institutional balance could be relied
upon to make sense of the unclear delimitation between Articles 290 and 291
TFEU: the broad interpretation of “amending” legislation following a
formalistic approach (resulting from a plain textual interpretation of Art. 290
TFEU) could upset the institutional balance if the legislature were to arrogate
to itself the review powers of Article 290 TFEU in a matter which,
substantively, is merely executive in nature and thus falling under Article 291
TFEU (which does not allow any scrutiny by the legislature).32 In such a case,
the institutional balance would require that a textual interpretation of Article
290 TFEU is dismissed. To further illustrate that not just any amendment of a
legislative act should be effected through a delegated act, the Advocate
General suggested the possibility of amending an annex to a legislative act
where that annex does not contain measures of general application. In such a
case, while a legislative act would be formally amended (hence
requiring recourse to the delegated act under Art. 290 TFEU), another
30. Ibid., para 45.
31. The Court rarely uses the institutional balance as a self-standing principle and instead
uses it as a short-hand to refer to the rules governing the inter-institutional relations. See
Chamon, “The institutional balance, an ill-fated principle of EU Law?”, 21 EPL (2015),
390–391. For another recent case, see Case C-409/13,Council v.Commission (Macro-financial
assistance to third countries), EU:C:2015:217, para 95, annotated in Chamon, “Upholding the
‘Community method’: Limits to the Commission’s power to withdraw legislative proposals –
Case C-409/13”, 40 EL Rev. (2015). For further illustrations, see Case C-77/11, Council v.
Parliament, EU:C:2013:559; Case C-73/14, Council v. Commission, EU:C:2015:663, para 61.
That the Court simply applies (general or specific) provisions of the Treaties under the banner
of the institutional balance may also (implicitly) be read into the analysis of Jacqué, who notes
that “the Court of Justice takes the institutional balance into account under a static aspect – that
is to say, as it results from the treaties …” and who only refers to the Chernobyl case as an
illustration of the institutional balance being used in a “dynamic” way (i.e. as a principle). See
Jacqué, “The principle of institutional balance”, 41 CML Rev. (2004), at 386 and 387.
32. See however Art. 11 of the Comitology Regulation 182/2011, O.J. 2011, L 55/13.
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precondition for recourse to Article 290 TFEU would not be fulfilled, since
that Article also explicitly provides that delegated acts are acts of general
application.33
The Advocate General concluded by finding that, following a literal
interpretation of Article 290 TFEU, an amendment to a legislative act should
be done through a delegated act. Only “in cases in which it is quite clear that
the amendment requiring to be made leaves the Commission no leeway and
will not affect the legislative elements of the basic act”34 could an amendment
be effectuated without recourse to a delegated act. To illustrate, the Advocate
General gave the example of the amendment of an annex by the Commission
on the basis of information provided by a Member State and where the
Commission is under an obligation to “automatically” amend the annex
accordingly.35
4.2 Applying the Advocate General’s test in casu
The remainder of the Advocate General’s Opinion was dedicated to applying
his general conclusions to the case at hand.
On the nature of decisions to suspend certain rules in a legislative act, the
Advocate General sided with the Commission, finding that such decisions
generally belong to the executive function.36 This lends support to the
Commission’s argument that the suspension in the second stage should be
given effect through an implementing act, just like the suspension in the first
stage.
However, the Advocate General noted that the suspension in the second
stage also resulted in a formal amendment of the legislative act because of the
addition of a footnote in Annex II.37 This raised the question whether recourse
to Article 290 TFEU was not automatically required. While the Advocate
General agreed that the addition of a footnote was not necessary to suspend a
visa waiver,38 he sided with the argument of the Parliament that the insertion
of the footnote and the suspension cannot be dissociated from each other.39
33. Whether this means an implementing act should be used to effect such an amendment is
not clear however. This would only be the case if Arts. 290 and 291 TFEU form a closed system,
but in case C-270/12, Short-selling, EU:C:2014:18, the Court confirmed that this is not the
case. See further infra.
34. Opinion of A.G. Mengozzi, para 49.
35. Ibid.
36. Ibid., para 58.
37. Ibid., para 59.
38. Ibid., para 62.
39. Ibid., para 63.
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As to why this is the case, the Advocate General remained rather unclear and
seemingly deferred to the legislature’s intention to incorporate the suspension
in the annex of the legislative act.40 For the Advocate General this meant that
the amendment did affect the legislative elements of the basic act,41 and he
further found that despite the automatic elements in the reciprocity
mechanism, there is still some discretion left to the Commission in the second
stage, meaning also the second condition of his test remained unfulfilled.42
Still, if the legislature’s intention determines the choice between a delegated
act and an implementing act, what kind of judicial review can the Court
exercise to scrutinize that choice? To answer this question the Advocate
General went back to his reading of Biocides and noted that while the
legislature has a broad discretion, it needs to make sure that the legislative act’s
content and structure is worked out in accordance with the Treaty framework.
It would thus fall to the Court to check whether the legislature had indeed done
so and whether the resulting content and structure is not arbitrary, irrational or
inconsistent.43 The Commission’s arguments thereon failed to convince the
Advocate General. As to the sense in leaving the Commission a greater
discretion when adopting an implementing act (in the first stage) than when
adopting a delegated act,44 the Advocate General did not find this
problematic45 and instead was more convinced by the argument that the
different stages follow the logic of an increasing intensity which goes together
with different acts at different levels of the hierarchy of norms.46
The Commission had also argued that the possibility to revoke the
delegation, a scrutiny mechanism only foreseen in Article 290 TFEU, was
nonsensical since if the revocation were exercised, the whole logic of the three
successive stages would collapse.47 The Advocate General noted that since the
revocation is foreseen in Article 290 TFEU itself, it is not abnormal for that
mechanism to be included in the contested regulation. In addition, the
Advocate General noted that the procedure can still continue to the third stage,
even when the second stage is “amputated”.48
As a result, the Advocate General proposed to the Court to dismiss the case.
40. Ibid., para 64.
41. Ibid., para 65.
42. Ibid., para 66.
43. Ibid., para 73.
44. Ibid., para 74.
45. Ibid., para 75.
46. Ibid., para 76.
47. Ibid., para 77.
48. Ibid.
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5. The Court’s ruling
In its judgment, the Court was very short and remarkably clear, concisely
setting out the basic principles governing this area of law post-Lisbon.
Fortunately it also continually referred back to its ruling in Biocides,
clarifying the latter by applying the general rules to be inferred from that
ruling to the present case.
Referring to Biocides, the Court first confirmed that the legislature indeed
has a discretion in its choice on whether to empower the Commission under
Article 290 or 291 TFEU, albeit that this discretion should evidently be
exercised in full respect of the framework laid down in those two articles.49
The Court thereby seems to have decided the discussion followingBiocides on
the genuinely discretionary nature of the legislature’s power in this respect.
The Court further repeated its observations in Biocides that a delegated act
serves “to achieve the adoption of rules coming within the regulatory
framework as defined by the basic legislative act”,50 while an implementing
act serves to “provide further detail in relation to the content of [the basic
act].”51 Crucially, it explicitly rejected the Commission’s argument (and the
possibility left by the Advocate General) that the discretion left to the
Commission (by the legislature) could be a relevant element in deciding
whether the Commission should be granted a delegated or an implementing
power.52
The Court then recalled the common ground between the parties in the
proceedings: the Commission had accepted that pursuant to the contested
provision, it would adopt acts of general application relating to the
non-essential elements of the basic act, while Parliament and Council did not
refute that the Commission would not be supplementing the basic act.
According to the Court the question then was whether the Commission would
be amending the basic act.
Scrutinizing the contested provision in casu, the Court repeated the
observation by the Advocate General to the effect that “[t]he mechanism for
implementing the principle of reciprocity is thus characterized by measures of
increasing gravity and political sensitivity, to which instruments of different
kinds correspond”,53 allowing it to refute the Commission’s argument that
49. Case C-88/14, Commission v. Parliament and Council, EU:C:2015:499, para 28.
50. Ibid., para 29.
51. Ibid., para 30.
52. Ibid., para 32.
53. Ibid., para 39.
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under the second stage just like under the first stage, an implementing act
ought to be adopted.54
Coming to the question whether the contested provision would allow the
Commission to amend the basic act, the Court remarked that the basic
legislative act provides in visa-free travel for certain third country nationals
and that an act adopted pursuant to the contested provision re-introducing a
visa requirement would “thus [have] the effect of amending, if only
temporarily, the normative content of the legislative act in question.”55 As to
the controversy on the effect of the requirement to add a footnote to Annex II,
the Court observed that that requirement “demonstrates . . . the intention of
the EU legislature to insert the act adopted on the basis of that provision in the
actual body of [the basic legislative act].”56
Finding that the contested provision would indeed allow an amendment of
the basic legislative act, the Court rejected the Commission’s argument on the
practical difficulties resulting from the legislature’s choice for a delegated,
rather than an implementing, power,57 concluding that the Commission’s
action should be dismissed.
6. Comment
The Court’s ruling should be welcomed for its clarity even if it will not be
welcomed by every commentator for its substance.
6.1. The Treaty exhaustively lists the relevant conditions and criteria
After all, the Court has effectively confirmed that the criteria and conditions
explicitly provided in Articles 290 and 291 TFEU are at the same time also the
only applicable criteria and conditions. As long as the legislature respects
these, it is completely free in its choice between empowering the Commission
either under Article 290 or 291 TFEU. So far, this is in line with Advocate
General Mengozzi’s reasoning, but at the same time the Court further solved
the debate on the existence of a grey area between the two types of acts, by
rendering the debate obsolete. While the present case again confirms the
conclusion, which could already be drawn from Biocides, that a grey area
54. Ibid., para 40.
55. Ibid., para 42.
56. Ibid., para 43.
57. Ibid., para 45.
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exists,58 the Court confirmed that it will not venture in this grey area itself,
since in this domain the legislature is the absolute sovereign.
That a grey area exists follows from there being situations in which the
criteria and conditions of both Articles 290 and 291 TFEU may be fulfilled.59
In Biocides, the Commission had invited the Court to rule that this is actually
not possible since Articles 290 and 291 TFEU constitute mutually exclusive
realms, requiring the Court to introduce further conditions and criteria (such
as e.g. the discretion left to the Commission to adopt further acts). The Court
in Biocides declined to do so and it has now ruled to the effect that no further
criteria and conditions exist. In light of the functions of both the delegated act
and the implementing act as identified by the Court,60 a pertinent question
here is whether the Court would still not step in if, even though respecting the
criteria and conditions laid down in Articles 290 and 291 TFEU, the
Commission is empowered to “provide further detail in relation to the content
of a basic act” through a delegated instead of an implementing act or to “adopt
rules coming within the framework of the basic act” through an implementing
instead of a delegated act. However, since they are worded generally and in an
overlapping way,61 even the basic functions of both acts would seem to be
unworkable criteria to distinguish delegated from implementing acts.
6.2. The Court confirms the legislature’s dominance
InVisa reciprocity, the Court – unlike inBiocides – does not really seem to link
the two types of acts any more. In Biocides, the Court remarked that “the
concept of an implementing act within the meaning of Article 291 TFEU must
be assessed in relation to the concept of a delegated act, as derived from
58. See Chamon, op. cit. supra note 19, at 187.
59. As Craig notes, any secondary measure will always “add” something to the basic act.
While Art. 290 TFEU provides that the delegated act ought to be used when a basic act is
“supplemented”, an implementing act under Art. 291 TFEU should also “add” something to the
basic act, otherwise it would serve no purpose. “The key issue is therefore whether what is
added will be regarded as ‘supplementing’ the legislative act.” See Craig, “Delegated acts,
implementing acts and the new Comitology Regulation”, 36 EL Rev. (2011), at 673. To clarify
this problem further one could think of the following illustration: under the direct support
scheme of the Common Agricultural Policy, a farmer is only eligible for direct support if his
activities are not insignificant (See Regulation 1307/2013). If the legislature had wanted to
empower the Commission to make this requirement more concrete it could have done so
through either Art. 290 or 291 TFEU, each time respecting the conditions and criteria listed in
those Articles. Clarifying the requirement of “insignificant activities” could be qualified as a
supplementation of the basic act, but it could also be qualified as an implementation, ensuring
that this requirement is applied uniformly to all farmers in the EU.
60. Case C-88/14, Commission v. Parliament and Council, paras. 29–30.
61. Ritleng, op. cit. supra note 3, at 251.
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Article 290 TFEU”62 but this idea is absent from the present case. In a sense,
this omission should be welcomed, since the idea that “the implementing act
cannot be understood without reference to the delegated act” creates the
impression that they form a closed system in which both acts are indeed
mutually exclusive. However, as noted, the Court actually rejected such
mutual exclusivity in Biocides. Furthermore, the Court had ruled earlier, in
Short-selling, that Articles 290 and 291 TFEU do not form a closed system,
but may instead be elaborated by the legislature to the effect that other
“executive” acts may be created in secondary legislation and that other
“executive” bodies, different from the Commission and Council, may
subsequently be empowered to adopt such acts.63
These cases taken together result in a remarkably strong position of the
legislature. The Court essentially confirms that the legislature is free to decide
whether (i) the Commission (either under Art. 290 or 291 TFEU), (ii) the
Council (under Art. 291 TFEU) or (iii) other executive bodies such as the
decentralized agencies will adopt further measures. The legislature should
only make sure that the conditions and criteria under Article 290
(Commission) or 291 TFEU (Commission or Council) are met when
empowering the Commission or Council. Given the lack of an enabling clause
in primary law to empower the decentralized agencies, there are no immediate
conditions and criteria which need to be met when the legislature decides to
empower an agency.64 Lenaerts justifies the legislature’s discretion to
empower executive bodies other than the Commission and Council by
referring to the legislature’s discretion confirmed in Biocides,65 but it should
be noted that Biocides (and now Visa reciprocity) confirm a discretion in
choosing between two Treaty-provided scenarios, while the empowerment of
EU agencies is unforeseen in primary law. It then seems doubtful that the
legislature ought to have the same discretion in both scenarios.
Focusing on the choice between empowering the Commission underArticle
290 or 291 TFEU, the question in casu depended on whether the contested
provision allowed an actual amendment of the basic legislative act. For the
Court, unlike the Advocate General, the controversy was solved once this
issue was determined.
62. Case C-427/12, Commission v. Parliament and Council, para 35.
63. Case C-270/12, UK v. Parliament and Council (short-selling).
64. However, some conditions could be deduced from Short-selling. After all, pursuant to
the contested provision in that case, the European Securities and Markets Authority could only
adopt (i) temporary measures, (ii) in exceptional circumstances (iii) in an area requiring very
technical expertise.
65. Lenaerts, “EMU and the EU’s constitutional framework”, 39 EL Rev. (2014), 762–763.
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6.3. A broad understanding of the concept of “amendment”?
On the issue of the possible amendment of the basic legislative act, the Court’s
judgment still leaves some ambiguity. In its arguments, the Commission had
suggested that the requirement that a footnote be added to Annex II was a
formalistic technique which merely served to ensure that the basic act was
formally amended, justifying recourse to a delegated act. On this, the Court
noted that the requirement of adding a footnote reflected “the intention of the
EU legislature to insert the [delegated] act . . . in the actual body of [the basic
legislative act].”66 This observation by the Court again shows how the
legislature’s intention rather than some objective criterion (other than those
laid down in Arts. 290 and 291 TFEU) is decisive in determining pursuant to
which Treaty article the Commission may be empowered.
The ambiguity referred to results from the Court’s further observation that
an amendment is at issue since the rules normally applicable (as laid down in
the basic legislative act) would be changed and would be laid down in a
delegated act. Here the Court did not rely on the formal amendment of the
basic legislative act, but instead stressed that the applicable rules (contained in
the basic legislative act) would be materially amended since the delegated act
sets out new rules henceforth governing the legal position of the third country
nationals concerned. This would suggest that recourse to a delegated act is
possible, even if there is no formal amendment of a legislative act. Instead, and
similar to the supplementation of a legislative act through a delegated act, if
the provisions contained in a legislative act are de facto amended this could be
done by delegated act.This would obviate the need for the legislature to rely on
formalistic arrangements such as the addition of a footnote in a basic
legislative act to make sure that the adoption of new provisions could qualify
as an amendment.
6.4. Should Visa reciprocity be welcomed?
In his comment on Biocides in this Review, Ritleng noted that that ruling will
have disappointed commentators both in respect of the criterion used (by the
Court) to demarcate Articles 290 and 291 TFEU (on which the constitutional
significance of the changes by the Lisbon Treaty depended) and in respect of
the Court’s scrutiny of the legislature’s application of the criterion.67 As
already hinted at, the Court’s ruling in the present case will not be welcomed
by those commentators either, since the Court’s criterion boils down to the
legislature’s intent and the Court limits its scrutiny to verifying whether the
66. Case C-88/14, Commission v. Parliament and Council, para 43.
67. Ritleng, op. cit. supra note 3, at 250–251.
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basic requirements explicitly set out in Article 290 TFEU (or Art. 291, as the
case may be) are respected. While the Court’s rulings could be criticized for
this, it should be noted that its post-Lisbon case law is basically a confirmation
of its earlier (pre-Lisbon) case law on comitology.68 On this case law,
Bergström noted: “the role of the Court . . . has been far from active: not only
has it proved itself unwilling to reduce the room for political negotiations but
it has also demonstrated a surprising ability to adapt itself to their result.”69
While the Court’s approach could thus be deplored, it cannot be qualified as a
break with its previous case law.70
Still, Biocides and Visa reciprocity may be deplored because they largely
leave the changes introduced by the Lisbon Treaty, which ought to be of
constitutional importance as noted by Ritleng, in the hands of the ordinary
legislature. In addition, there could be some concern about the fact that the
Court’s rulings leave the Commission in a rather weak position versus the
legislature.71 Here, however, it should be noted that the legislature (only) has
a broad discretion in choosing between two ways to empower the
Commission, the latter being the authority on which powers are conferred in
68. It should be noted that the Court’s non-interventionist approach does not simply benefit
the legislature, but may also favour the Commission. For a post-Lisbon illustration, see the
Court’s rejection of the Parliament’s complaint that the Commission had not respected
Regulation 492/2011 when implementing (pursuant toArt. 291(2) TFEU) its provisions in Case
C-65/13, Parliament v. Commission, EU:C:2014:2289. In a currently pending case, Parliament
reproaches the Commission of not respecting Art. 290 TFEU by adopting a delegated act
modifying (rather than merely supplementing) the basic legislative act. See Case C-286/14,
Parliament v. Commission, O.J. 2014, C 253/21.
69. Bergström, Comitology: Delegation of Powers in the European Union and the
Committee System (OUP, 2006), p. 319.
70. By way of illustration, Spain’s challenge to the Unitary Patent Package may be referred
to here as well. Spain had challenged the legality of Regulation 1257/2012 inter alia on the
ground that by entrusting the setting of the renewal fees to an EU Member State committee of
the European Patent Organization (EPO), the Regulation violated Art. 291(2) TFEU since the
Commission ought to have been empowered. The Court dubiously dismissed the plea (i) by
noting that the renewal fees for European Patents with Unitary Protection do not necessarily
have to be uniform for all Member States and (ii) by finding that the contested Regulation was
a special agreement in the sense of Art. 149 of the European Patent Convention and that the
setting of fees therefore falls to the bodies of the EPO. As regards the renewal fees, they have in
the meantime (logically?) been set uniformly at the “true Top 4 level”. As regards the second
argument, it is remarkable, and contrary to the idea of an autonomous EU legal order, that the
Court relies on a provision of international law to disapply a provision of EU primary law. See
Case C-146/13, Spain v. Parliament and Council, EU:C:2015:298, paras. 77–83.
71. Although some commentators were initially worried that the possible lack of
further criteria to be developed by the Court would leave the Commission in too strong a
position, see Sydow, “Europäische exekutive Rechtsetzung zwischen Kommission,
Komitologieausschüssen, Parlament und Rat”, 67 JZ (2012), at 160 and 163.
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any case.72 The Court might be stricter if it has to test whether the legislature
rightly conferred implementing powers on the Council (under Art. 291 TFEU)
rather than on the Commission. While pre-Lisbon the Court’ review of this
choice was also lenient,73 the new set-up under Lisbon might persuade the
Court to verify more strictly whether the Council has been conferred
implementing powers in duly justified specific cases.74 Lastly, the Court also
recently confirmed, in theMFA case,75 that the Commission retains the right to
withdraw its legislative proposal in those cases in which the legislature plans
to adopt amendments in such a way that the original objective of the proposal
is frustrated. While it may be doubted that an amendment (by Council and/or
Parliament) changing a proposed delegated power to an implementing power
(or vice-versa), could be so fundamental that it frustrates the purpose of the
Commission’s proposal, such a scenario could still be tested.
7. Conclusion
In the present case, the Court seems to have definitively solved the issue of the
delimitation between Articles 290 and 291 TFEU. Visa reciprocity confirms
and clarifies Biocides in that there is a grey area between the two Articles but
since there are no further criteria (other than those explicitly provided in Arts.
290 and 291 TFEU), the legislature enjoys full discretion in choosing between
the two types of acts as long as it respects the framework set by the Treaty
articles. While the Advocate General’s nuanced analysis, as is often the case,
72. In this regard Buchanan notes that “it is not clear whether the Commission has more
power under Art. 290 or 291(2) TFEU.” See Buchanan, op. cit. supra note 19, at 272. Indeed,
while the Commission is not subject to the scrutiny of committees when adopting delegated acts
and while the Commission can exercise a legislative function through delegated acts,
implementing acts also allow it to exercise a normative function (albeit more restricted). In
addition, the Commission also controls the comitology procedures to a degree, since it presides
the committees.
73. In Visa policy, the Court noted that the Council’s justifications for reserving
implementing powers to itself were “both general and laconic”, but it still dismissed the
Commission’s case. See Case C-257/01, Commission v. Council, EU:C:2005:25, para 53.
74. Under the Nice Treaty the Council could exercise implementing powers simply in
specific cases. However, under Nice, it was also the Council which reserved implementing
powers to itself underArt. 202 EC. UnderArt. 291(2)TFEU, it is the legislature that has a choice
between empowering the Commission (default situation) and empowering the Council (in duly
justified specific cases or for CFSP matters). This could also affect the Court’s assessment of
such a choice, since the Council does not “reserve” powers to itself any more. The decision of
an institution reserving powers to itself should arguably be scrutinized more closely than a
conferral of implementing powers by the legislature (even if it is the Council acting as
(co-)legislator and the conferral de facto resembles a reservation of powers).
75. See Case C-409/13, Council v. Commission (Macro-financial assistance to third
countries). For a discussion, see Chamon, op. cit. supra note 19, EL Rev.
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was more interesting from a legal perspective, the Court’s straightforward
approach appears preferable, preventing endless litigation on the issue and
instead leaving it to the political arena.
Still, the Court’s solution begs the question what remains of the
constitutional significance of the changes introduced by the Lisbon Treaty to
the EU’s comitology system. One could argue that the freedom left to the
legislature is at odds with the constitutional repercussions which a choice
between empowering the Commission to adopt either delegated or
implementing acts ought to have. One could also deplore the weak position in
which the Commission is left, in its political struggle with the legislature.
However, from that perspective, the Court’s sanctioning of significant
empowerments to EU agencies in Short-selling seems a greater threat than the
Court’s sanctioning of the legislature’s discretion in its choice to empower the
Commission under either Article 290 or 291 TFEU.
In all, the take home message of Visa reciprocity is that the Court has
clarified that it will not elaborate the framework of Articles 290 and 291
TFEU with further criteria or requirements. The decision on empowering the
Commission is thereby left to the political process (of course within the
confines of the primary law framework) with the final word for the
(co-)legislator(s).
Merijn Chamon*
* Post-doctoral assistant at the Ghent European Law Institute, department of European,
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